The state of Maharashtra in India has signed an MoU with Rosatom, Russia’s Atomic Energy Corporation, which is responsible for all civil and military nuclear assets in Russia.

The ‘Mah-Ros’ MoU for development of Thorium-based small modular nuclear reactors (Thorium-SMRs) under the ‘Make in Maharashtra’ initiative, has three main objectives namely, Develop a Thorium-SMR in Maharashtra, Commercialise Thorium-SMRs as per the safety standards of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), and Establish an assembly line for Thorium-SMRs.

The main objectives of the Mah-Ros MoU include nuclear power research and development, large-scale manufacture of nuclear equipment and systems; acquisition, handling, storage and use of radionuclides; and commercial operation of Thorium-SMRs. However, the entire spectrum of nuclear activities, from power generation and research, to safety regulations and international collaborations, are the exclusive domain of the Dept of Atomic Energy (DAE) under the Union Government. [Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, List 1, Item 6: Atomic energy and mineral resources necessary for its production].

However, the Atomic Energy Act 1962 (AEA-1962), Section 14 “Control over production and use of atomic energy”, authorises Central Government to grant licence for the acquisition, production, possession, use, disposal, export or import of any of the prescribed substances; or of any minerals or other substances specified in the rules, or of any plant designed or adopted or manufactured for the production, development and use of atomic energy or for research into connected matters. Section 27 “Delegation of powers”, permits the Central Government to delegate its powers or duty under AEA-1962, to an officer or authority subordinate to Central Government, or a State Government, or such officer or authority subordinate to a State Government, by issuing an order or direction to that effect.

Thus, under AEA-1962, Central Government may grant licence to, or issue orders/directions delegating its power and duty to Maharashtra Government. If grant of licence and/or delegation of powers concerning Thorium-SMRs, was not done prior to Maharashtra signing the Mah-Ros MoU, both Central Government and Maharashtra Government may have violated AEA-1962. Notwithstanding, whether or not grant of licence and/or delegation of powers was done, or is done subsequently, some issues arise. The issues concern public health and safety, viability of Thorium-SMRs, nuclear regulatory oversight of the module manufacturing assembly line, quality control and certification of the modules manufactured on assembly line scale, operational costs, installation and operation of the Thorium-SMRs, disposal of waste radionuclides, and liability and cost of insurance in the event of nuclear damage, according to Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act 2010 (CLND-2010).

Focus on major issues and troubling questions

#1. The Mah-Ros MoU was a State initiative for ‘Small Modular Reactor with Thorium Fuel’, signed in the presence of Maharashtra CM Fadnavis. The news report states that Maharashtra Institution for Transformation (MITRA) will provide strategic support for the “Make in Maharashtra” joint development of the Thorium-SMRs. There is no mention made of a representative of DAE being present. Were the commercial and technical contents of the terms of the MoU scrutinised and approved by DAE?

#2. According to the news report, all legal provisions and safety protocols as laid out by the Government of India for nuclear energy will be strictly followed during implementation. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Report, “Grant of independent status to AERB” comments upon inadequacy of regulatory oversight by AERB for the existing nuclear power and fuel-cycle installations under DAE, and recommends early institution of an independent Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA), as required by IAEA. But Government appears to be in no hurry to act on this matter, which concerns public health and safety.

Lack of independent regulatory oversight heightens the risk to public health due to emissions from nuclear installations. That said, effective implementation of nuclear safety regulations by an independent regulator, can only reduce risks or mitigate severity of “events” on the International Nuclear Events Scale (INES), but not eliminate them.

The mass production of SMRs will cause hugely magnified necessity for credible quality control, quality assurance and regulatory oversight, in order to ensure adherence to production and safety standards set by IAEA, at all stages of production and module assembly, and subsequently for starting-up, operation and waste disposal. In the absence of an independent NSRA, will AERB be in a position to effectively ensure adherence to health and safety protocols?

#3. According to available information, DAE constructed a prototype Thorium-based 600-MWe Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) starting in the 1980s. Based upon the rich experience gained over many years, and in keeping with approved safety standards, DAE constructed two 500-MWe FBRs, and after regulatory oversight, approval for starting the nuclear reaction was granted only in 2024. Can DAE’s decades of experience with 500-MWe FBRs using mixture of Uranium U-235 and Plutonium (P-239), be translated to SMRs using Thorium Th-232, for commercial scale production and deployment? Has DAE constructed a test Thorium-SMR?

#4. Maharashtra’s initiative for commercial scale, assembly line production of Thorium-SMRs, will demand large-scale mining of Monazite sand from beaches in the coastal areas of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra. There is already on-going erosion of coastal areas, and coastal communities are migrating inland, due to loss of habitats and livelihoods. Coastal erosion will be aggravated by large-scale mining of Monazite sands. Rise of sea level due to Climate Change, will further aggravate coastal erosion, and have unpredictable social, environmental, economic, and political consequences at both state and national levels. Is Maharashtra’s Thorium-SMR initiative in keeping with the adaptation and mitigation measures of the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC)?

#5. According to available information, about 5% of Thorium dioxide (ThO2) occurs in Monazite sand, and ThO2 is extracted in a 3-stage process using corrosive chemicals like highly concentrated H2SO4 or NaOH, with serious environmental consequences. One 2019 study of the Thorium extraction process, published in the Nuclear Engineering and Technology Journal estimates that the production cost per kilogram of ThO2 ranged from about US$1,360 down to US$55, depending upon scale. Can one presume that the foregoing environmental and cost matters have been factored into the MoU signed with Rosatom, and into Maharashtra’s financial planning and budget?

Conclusion

For decades past, the nuclear industry has been claiming that nuclear power is safe, clean, and cheap, all intimately linked parameters. Besides persons (including nuclear scientists) who have cogently argued against nuclear power, events in various countries around the globe over decades, have demonstrated the invalidity of this self-certification.

In the face of global warming concerns, the nuclear industry claims that nuclear power has a lower carbon footprint than power generated using fossil fuels, and makes it a valuable means of combating climate change. This claim can only be substantiated by a transparent, holistic energy audit, which includes assessing the carbon footprints of routine nuclear waste handling, storage and final disposal, of handling routine nuclear “events” in nuclear installations, of managing nuclear disasters like Windscale (UK), Three Mile Island (USA), Chernobyl (USSR/Russia), and Fukushima (Japan), and of decommissioning nuclear installations, especially nuclear reactors.

The environmental/ecological benefits of nuclear power – even if true – cannot justify the considerable, irreversible public health and safety radiation hazards and risks, that the present generations and many future generations of people, are exposed to and will be exposed to, from decommissioned nuclear installations, hastily disposed nuclear waste, etc., for many thousands of years.

In the context of the Mah-Ros MoU, it is for consideration whether Maharashtra is relying upon Russia’s Thorium-SMR technology, without the mandatory regulatory oversight of DAE’s AERB. One is left to wonder whether the Mah-Ros MoU includes transfer of Thorium-SMR technology, and whether it defines Rosatom’s liability according to Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act 2010 (CLND-2010). The Russian nuclear industry (Rosatom) may well be validating commercial scaling-up of its Thorium-SMR technology, by externalising the radiation risks and hazards to India’s people and environment.

In view of the foregoing, and of the serious concerns argued above, it might appear that proliferating nuclear reactors by assembly line mass production of SMRs, is questionable.

The Indian government would do well to re-consider and review the SMR program, phase out the nuclear power program rather than expanding it, and transfer research and funding towards solar power generation.