On March 14th, 2016, Greenpeace India called for a probe by independent experts into all aging heavy water reactors in the country, claiming the country’s nuclear regulator has failed to ascertain the reason behind the recent incident at Kakrapar Atomic Power Station in Gujarat, which happened, ironically, exactly five years after the meltdowns began at Fukushima Daiichi NPP. At the time of this writing an incident of still undetermined seriousness is underway at the Kakrapar NPP. Dianuke released this report on March 13, 2016.
The article that follows this introduction tells the story of how heavy water reactor technology bought from Canada, and used in the Kakrapar facility, was involved in the development of the Indian nuclear weapons program. The article is a a segment of a longer article that was written in 1996, so readers should bear this in mind when they note the facts and figures mentioned.
Opponents of nuclear energy are often told that they make a big mistake in saying nuclear energy and nuclear weapons are two sides of the same nefarious coin. Proponents of nuclear energy say that nuclear weapons can be eliminated while still giving all nations of the world the benefits of the “peaceful” applications of nuclear energy. In fact, all international agreements on nuclear weapons permit nations to pursue the option of developing nuclear energy, so the official policies of the UN and the “international community” are a very long way from agreeing with the anti-nuclear activists who say that nuclear energy cannot be separated from the development of nuclear weapons.
One could say that the possibility of separating nuclear energy and nuclear weapons exists as an ideal, but when one looks at the history of what actually happened when the international community tried to promote the peaceful use of the atom, it turned out that the promotion of nuclear energy led to catastrophic nuclear power plant failures and to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and though these problems have been dealt with to some extent, there is no reason to believe that they have been, or can be, completely solved.
In 1974, India exploded a nuclear weapon that it had produced with plutonium made from the CANDU heavy water reactors sold by Canada. Canada had insisted that part of the deal be that the technology could be used only for peaceful purposes and not for nuclear explosions, but after the bomb was detonated India claimed that the plutonium had been used for a “peaceful nuclear explosion.” In this dispute, it seems that India made a rather dishonest and disingenuous interpretation, but one could say there was more truth in their view and a grave misunderstanding of nuclear technology on the part of Canada. In fact, India was right, in a certain sense. It is impossible to say which nuclear applications are peaceful and which are not. There is no peaceful way of processing uranium and splitting atoms. Its violent effects on living beings become apparent as soon as it is removed from under the earth’s surface.
For the next two decades Canada and other nations, through the Nuclear Suppliers Group, imposed sanctions on nuclear deals with India, but as the 21st century approached, the nuclear industry was eager to sell reactors to India, and thus the US, Japan, Canada and others prepared to “turn the page,” heed the “lessons learned” and get down to business (see a previous article on this topic: Reasons to Oppose the India-Japan Nuclear Deal). But what was the lesson learned? India showed the world that as long as a nation can make a show of being a reliable ally in “the global community” and not become a pariah state like North Korea, it can get its “peaceful” atoms, then sin first and ask forgiveness later when it wants to detonate a bomb. It will definitely be forgiven because profit eventually wins out over concern for non-proliferation principles.
The nations selling the reactors now say that proliferation safeguards are in place, that the lessons of 1974 have been learned—even if India still refuses to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty or even consider eliminating its nuclear arsenal. In 2015, an editorial in the Canadian newspaper The Globe and Mail lauded the business opportunities in a new agreement to sell uranium to India, stating:
“India has never publicly apologized for its duplicity in using Canadian technology to become a nuclear-weapons power. For Canada, it was a painful lesson in realpolitik. Both have moved past it in the interest of wider goals. Given that the genie long ago escaped, it’s the right decision—and a cautionary tale.”
In this case “wider goals” means profitable nuclear deals that Indians will pay for. Canada, and other nations involved in this further development of nuclear technology, must be judged not by their intentions but by the predictable consequences of their actions and what their permissive behavior signals to other actors in the game. A predictable consequence of building nuclear reactors is that the plutonium produced in them will be used by any sufficiently determined country to build weapons, regardless of international oversight. This fact hasn’t changed since 1974. Enabling the transgressors just sends a signal to other nations that they can do the same. Anyone who places faith in international oversight should keep in mind that the agency charged with ensuring non-proliferation is the IAEA, the same agency that claimed before March 11, 2011 to be ensuring, without enforcement powers, the highest safety standards in the operation of nuclear power plants in Japan and elsewhere.
-Dennis Riches, guest editor of Dianuke, March 18, 2016
The article below has been republished with permission of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility
Exporting Disaster: The Cost of Selling CANDU Reactors
by David Martin, Nuclear Awareness Project for the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, November 1996
3.2.1. CANDUs for India
220.127.116.11. The CIRUS Research Reactor:
The first Canadian reactor export took place in 1956. It was a “research” and plutonium production reactor modelled on the 40 MW NRX (National Research X-metal or X-perimental) reactor that began operation at Chalk River in 1947. The NRX was a heavy water moderated reactor that was built to produce plutonium for the American nuclear weapons program. It was well known that heavy water moderation results in very efficient plutonium production.
The Indian reactor was part of an aid program organized under the Colombo Plan Administration. The total cost of the reactor was about $17 million, of which the Canadian government provided $9.5 million as foreign aid under the Colombo Plan.  The reactor was known as CIRUS (Canada-India-Reactor-United States). The “US” was added because the United States supplied the heavy water for the reactor. The reactor went critical in July 1960, and became infamous as the source of plutonium used by India to manufacture the nuclear bomb it exploded in May 1974. It was still in operation in 1996.
18.104.22.168. The RAPP-1 Power Reactor:
After the start-up of the CIRUS reactor in 1960, AECL negotiated another reactor export to India. In 1963 an agreement was signed for export of a 200 MWe power reactor modelled on the Douglas Point reactor at the Bruce site in Ontario, even though Douglas Point was not in service until January 7, 1967. The Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP) was built at Rawatbata, 64 km southwest of Kota in the northwestern Indian state of Rajasthan.
The total estimated cost of RAPP-1 [ now known as RAPS-1, for “Rajasthan Atomic Power Station Number 1” ] was $79 million, of which $35 million was to be spent in Canada,  financed by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation (ECIC – predecessor of the Export Development Corporation). The plant began operation in 1972. It should be noted that AECL also gave India, free of charge, the technical and design information for construction of the 200 MW reactor. 
A serious problem with cracking of the reactor’s end shield led to the reactor being shut down for long periods, and the reactor was finally downrated to 100 MW. 
22.214.171.124. The RAPP-2 Power Reactor:
In 1966, another agreement was signed by Canada and India for construction of a second 200 MW reactor RAPP-2 [now known as RAPS-2, for “Rajasthan Atomic Power Station Number 2”] with some improvements, at the same site as RAPP-1. The ECIC provided $38.5 million financing for the project’s Canadian services and equipment.  Perhaps because of concessionary financing terms, or because of the earlier provision of the CIRUS reactor, the contract was signed (like the first reactor) without international tenders.
The reactor was still under construction in 1974, when India exploded a nuclear bomb, and Canadian personnel stopped work on the project. The lack of Canadian support delayed start-up of RAPP-2 until 1981. Canadian government financing for RAPP-1 and RAPP-2 totalled at least $140 million, payable over fifteen years with about six years’ grace at 6%.  The Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was involved with construction and commissioning of the two RAPP reactors, and also fabricated some fuel. Indian content in RAPP-1 was 55% and 75% of RAPP 2. 
Canada’s nuclear non-proliferation safeguards were strengthened following India’s 1974 explosion of a nuclear bomb fueled with plutonium made in the CIRUS reactor. Following the explosion of the weapon, and the failure of subsequent negotiations, Canada ended nuclear assistance to India.
RAPP-2 (now known as RAPS-2 for Rajasthan Atomic Power Station) was shut down in August 1994, and RAPS-1 was shut down in February 1994, both for maintenance and for detailed examination of pressure tubes.  By May 1995, it was announced that RAPS-2 would be shut down for at least three years to conduct a full retubing, after hydrogen blisters and elongation were found in several pressure tubes.  It has been reported that RAPS-1 may restart in January 1997, following repairs to the pressure relief system, although a total retubing for that reactor is also apparently planned. 
At issue is the fact that pressure tubes in the RAPS reactors are made of Zircalloy-2, a zirconium-steel alloy used only at early CANDU reactors. This alloy is a problem because of its susceptibility to embrittlement and elongation. Embrittlement in 1983 of a pressure tube in Ontario Hydro’s Pickering reactor-2 led to a metre-long rupture and a major loss of coolant accident. All of India’s PHWRs prior to Kakrapar-2 have used Zircalloy tubes. Kakrapar-2 has used the zirconium-niobium alloy that has been used in later CANDU reactors. 
3.2.2. The Indian Nuclear Program
126.96.36.199. Current Status
Nuclear power and nuclear R&D in India are under direct control of the Prime Minister through the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), below which is the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). In an inappropriate linkage, the nuclear regulatory agency, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), also reports to the AEC. The DAE has a number of subdivisions and companies.
The Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) was created in 1986, and given responsibility for design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants (with the exception of RAPS-1  , which because of serious problems was left separate as a “non-commercial” plant). The NPC was intended to operate as a private company, however, as one industry commentator said, because of “NPC’s low level of profitability . . . investors could have earned more return on their investment in a standard deposit account”. 
In addition to [ the Canadian-supplied CANDUs ] RAPS-1 and RAPS-2, India now has six Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs)  in operation, all 200 MW reactors modelled on the [ Canadian-built CANDU ] Douglas Point and [ the Canadian-supplied ] RAPS reactors. They are (in-service dates noted):
Kakrapar-1 (KAPS-1), 05/93;
Kakrapar-2 (KAPS-2), 01/95;
Kalpakkam-1 (MAPS-1), 01/84;
Kalpakkam-2 (MAPS-2), 03/86;
Narora-1 (NAPS-1), 01/91; and
Narora-2 (NAPS-2), 07/92.
In addition, India has two 160 MWe Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) known as Tarapur (TAPS) 1 & 2, that went in service in 1969. Other than RAPS 1 & 2, these are India’s only foreign-supplied reactors. They were turn-key projects built by General Electric.  Four more 200 MW PHWRs – Kaiga-1 & 2, and Rajasthan-3 & 4 – are expected to start up in the 1998-99 fiscal year.
India has five research/production reactors:
Apsara (1 MWt pool type);
CIRUS (40 MWt, heavy water);
Dhruva (100 MWt, heavy water);
Kamini (30 kWt, U-233 fuelled); and the
FBTR (40 MW Fast Breeder Test Reactor). 
India’s PHWRs have suffered from a number of problems that have resulted in very poor performance. For example MAPS 1 & 2 (the Madras Atomic Power Station in the state of Tamil Nadu) were ordered in 1967 and 1971, and took 17 and 15 years to bring into service. Problems with their heat transport systems have resulted in their downrating to 175 MWe.
In a potentially disastrous accident, NAPS-1 was shut down in 1993 after turbine blades broke, igniting a hydrogen fire in the turbine coolant that destroyed the turbine hall, and blacked out the station. With safety systems out of action, reactor cooling was maintained only by diverting an emergency source. 
In a stinging rebuke for the Indian nuclear industry, the outgoing Chairperson of India’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), A. Gopalakrishnan, stated,
“Many of our nuclear installations have aged with time and have serious problems which are characteristic of the early vintage designs. Our own efforts to find indigenous solutions to these problems are not well organised or focused. The country had an inherent capability to tackle these problems, but the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has uniquely failed in bringing together these national strengths and coordinating them for the benefit of the nuclear sector.” 
Gopalakrishnan noted that the AERB is only a “subordinate body” of the DAE, although he had strived for independence. He also noted that safety concerns are increasing, with more than 130 safety problems at various sites that need urgent action. 
The Indian nuclear industry is subsidized by the state. The NPC alone received a subsidy of 9.7524 billion rupees (about US $282.678) for the 1996-97 fiscal year. However, this represented a cutback of about Rs 1.5 billion (about US $43 million) from the previous year.  Attempts by the NPC to attract investment have also remained unsuccessful, and despite artificially low electricity rates, State Electricity Boards have remained delinquent in their payments, being in arrears a total of Rs 2.5 billion in March 1996. 
188.8.131.52. Fuel Cycle Activities (Plutonium et al.)
India is committed to several advanced fuel cycles, notably a thorium fuel cycle, and thorium fuel bundles have been produced and used in Kakrapar-1. The Advanced Fuel Fabrication Facility at Tarapur has also produced MOX fuel bundles [a mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides] for PHWRs and is working on bundles for BWRs. The Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) is located at the Indira Ghandi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) on the MAPS site at Kalpakkam near Madras. Ten years after start-up in October 1985, the FBTR is still operating only at low power levels. Design work is also taking place on a 500 MWe fast breeder prototype.
March 1996 saw the start-up of India’s third reprocessing facility at IGCAR (the other two are at Tarapur and Trombay). The BARC site at Trombay was built between 1961 and 1964, and has capacity of about 30 tonnes per year. It uses the Purex process with solvent extraction columns [to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel], and reprocesses fuel from the Dhruva and CIRUS reactors. India’s main reprocessing facility at Tarapur started up in 1969. Although it has a nominal capacity of 100 tonnes per year, it has not functioned at full capacity. It reprocesses the spent fuel from the Tarapur, Rajasthan and Madras reactors. 
3.2.3. India and the Bomb
On May 18, 1974, India exploded a 12 kiloton fission weapon at the Pokhran site in the Rajasthan desert. The land for the test had been acquired in 1966, when 200,000 people had been forcibly displaced. 
The weapon was made with plutonium from the CIRUS reactor. Canada had transferred the CIRUS to India on the condition that it be used for peaceful purposes, but did not require external inspections. Although Canada advised India that plutonium from the reactor could not be used for nuclear explosives, India claimed that the agreement did not exclude nuclear explosions “for peaceful purposes”. Following the 1974 explosion, India stuck to its story that the test was a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE).  Technically, Canada considers the agreement to be still in effect, although it is not clear if India does. For the last twenty years, India has denied having nuclear weapons, but it has admitted the capability of making them.
The Indian nuclear test was a crippling blow to the myth of the peaceful Canadian nuclear program. Canada had received many warnings that India was moving towards nuclear weapons production, but had done little about it. Pierre Trudeau had even visited India in 1971 to discuss the matter personally with Indira Ghandi. However, in the wake of the test, on May 22, 1974, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Mitchell Sharp stated,
“The Canadian government has suspended shipments to India of nuclear equipment and material and has instructed the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, pending clarification of the situation [it took two years to “clarify”], to suspend its cooperation with India regarding nuclear reactor projects and the more general technological exchange arrangements which it has with the Indian Energy Commission.” 
In December of 1974, a new proliferation policy was partially revealed. It required a binding assurance that Canadian nuclear material, equipment and technology would not be used for a nuclear explosive device, and rejected the excuse of “peaceful nuclear explosions”. The policy also prohibited in the “contamination clause” the use of Canadian-supplied technology for nuclear explosive devices. Thirdly, exporters of nuclear technology and materials had to go through the Department of Industry Trade and Commerce, and the Atomic Energy Control Board.  These three points were actually part of an 8-point program approved by Cabinet in December 1974, but not made public until 1975. The other safeguards included:
“…a binding recognition of Canada’s right of prior consent over: transfers to third countries; reprocessing of Canadian-origin material; and enrichment of uranium beyond 20%. As well, Canada maintained the right to apply fall-back safeguards on reprocessing and enrichment should IAEA safeguards cease to be applied for any reason. Finally a binding commitment required the provision of adequate physical protection for Canadian-origin material.” 
For two years after the Indian nuclear test, Canada continued with negotiations in order to convince India to accept the new safeguards. However, India remained obdurate, and on May 18, 1976, Canada formally terminated nuclear co-operation. The nominal reason was that India agreed to safeguard only the two Rajasthan reactors. 
In December 1976, the Canadian government announced a further upgrading of its non-proliferation policy when its decided that nuclear trade would be restricted to those countries which had signed the Non Proliferation Treaty.  The fundamental problem of course with paper safeguards, is that agreements can simply be ignored. This was clearly seen in the original transgression of India in the use of plutonium from CIRUS despite a bilateral agreement. The ineffectiveness of safeguards was also seen more recently in the case of Iraq, which developed a nuclear weapons program despite being a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Regardless of whether India has continued to use plutonium from the CIRUS reactor for nuclear weapons, it now has other sources which it can use. In 1985, the 100 MW Dhruva reactor went critical, and it is theoretically capable of making 25 kilograms of plutonium per year. It is usually estimated that 5 to 8 kg of plutonium is the minimum required for a basic fission weapon.
A 200 MW CANDU is capable of making 50 to 60 kg of weapons grade plutonium annually.  Indian now has six reactors of this size operating, in addition to the two RAPS reactors that operated sporadically since 1972 and 1981. All of these reactors were built using the CANDU technology that Canada provided. India’s decision to opt for an advanced fuel cycle with a breeder reactor involves the reprocessing of fuel to extract plutonium, which provides the infrastructure and effective camouflage for military production and reprocessing.
3.2.4. Indian Politics and the Bomb
The initial motivation for the Indian nuclear weapons program was the first nuclear weapons test by China in 1964. However, in the 1970s, nuclear competition shifted to Pakistan. Hostilities run deep between Pakistan and India after the post-colonial partition, three wars, and an ongoing bitter conflict over the possession of Kashmir, aggravated by the Sikh separatist movement in India.
Recent events have made the escalation of nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan a distinct possibility. In 1995, it was widely reported, after satellite surveillance reports by US intelligence, that India was preparing for another nuclear test in Rajasthan.  It is very likely that if India tested another nuclear weapon, Pakistan would respond in kind.
Both India and Pakistan have refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. India also blocked consensus for adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in Geneva in August 1996, meaning that it could not be forwarded to the United Nations General Assembly and approved with immediate legal force. While Pakistan voted for the Treaty at the General Assembly, all 44 nations with nuclear reactors (including India) must sign the treaty to bring it into legal force, and Pakistan has said that it will not sign unless India does. 
The nuclear bomb is popular in India. In the May 1996 national election, the Congress Party, dominant in India since independence, received a lower vote than ever before. The Hindu fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) received the largest share of the vote. The BJP is a longtime and consistent supporter of an open nuclear weapons program, as well as the deployment of short and intermediate-range missile delivery systems.  Although the BJP only exercised power briefly before being replaced by a coalition government, the political situation is very unstable. Support for the BJP is a measure of the popularity of the ‘Hindu bomb’.
Over the last 20 years, India has certainly had the opportunity to produce enough plutonium for several hundred nuclear weapons.  A test would allow it to try a so-called ‘boosted’ fission weapon, or even a thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb. Nuclear weaponeers in Pakistan would like to see another Indian test, in order to justify bringing their nuclear program out of the closet. It remains to be seen if the CTBT agreement will exercise any constraint on India and Pakistan.
3.2.5. The Downgrading of Canadian Safeguards – India
In October 1996, Foreign Affairs spokesperson John Bell denied a report from India that Canada would end its 22 year boycott on nuclear trade with India.  However, Bell was less than honest about the real situation. Canada has been backing off from its boycott since 1989.
In the 1988 Annual Report of the CANDU Owners Group (COG), Chairperson Hugh Irvine stated that “…discussions were opened with the Canadian government on the possible participation of India and Pakistan in the COG Information Exchange Program.”  In the following year’s Annual Report, it was noted that “India and Pakistan joined this program [the Information Exchange Program] mid-year…”.  There was no public consultation or parliamentary debate on the re-start of Indo-Canadian nuclear relations.
In June 1994, former AECL CANDU President Donald Lawson wrote to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to draw their attention to safety problems at the RAPS reactors. At that time he said, “The conditions are such that there is a real potential for a … pressure tube rupture to occur at any time”.  AECL’s motivation was certainly not altruistic, however. In 1993, S.K. Chatterjee, managing director of India’s Nuclear Power Corporation, had invited western nuclear companies to submit “pre-qualification documents” for the retubing of India’s PHWRs.  AECL would undoubtedly like to bid on these contracts, and has been pressuring the federal government to remove or loosen its restrictions on nuclear relations with India.
In October 1994, an Ontario Hydro Nuclear employee on secondment to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Frank King, reported that he had arranged a meeting between “nine Canadians from AECL and Ontario Hydro and nine Indian experts” in July 1994 to discuss the safety of pressure tubes in the two RAPP reactors sold to them by Canada. King stated that he would be making his second trip to India in December 1994.  In February 1995, it was reported that “In the interest of safety, Canada has now reinstated limited contacts with India”.  In April 1995, the Canadian television station CTV reported that AECL staff visited India in March 1995 to discuss Canadian assistance on the retubing of the RAPP reactors, and have also been discussing the sale of CANDU reactors to India.  In fact, the Managing Director of the CANDU Owners Group (COG), Barry Collingwood, led a four-person group to India in March 1995 to meet with officials of the Nuclear Power Corporation. He stated, “We have reached informal agreement on a broad scope of possible cooperation on core assessment, in-service inspection, and safety related quality assurance associated with retubing.”  The nuclear industry, led by COG, has clearly been pressing the federal government to downgrade its non-proliferation policy for both India and Pakistan. In the COG 1994-95 Annual Report, Collingwood stated,
“Another impediment to the flow of information between CANDU stations is the Canadian export policy restrictions currently being placed on two of our members; India (with nine operating CANDU stations) and Pakistan (with one operating station). We will continue to encourage the Canadian Government to review their export policy with the ultimate objective of reducing the current restrictions on cooperation among CANDU stations” 
In May 1995, Collingwood formally asked the Canadian government to allow the restart of commercial nuclear relations with India.  There has been no public response on this matter from the government. Clearly, however, without any public consultation or parliamentary debate, the government has quietly been eroding its non-proliferation restrictions for India and Pakistan over a period of years. This process began in 1989 by allowing the provision of nuclear technical information through the CANDU Owners Group. Information exchange and provision of various services may be a prelude to the re-introduction of full-scale commercial relations.
Sources for further reading (added by Dianuke, 2016/03):
“1974: Canada blamed for India’s ‘peaceful’ bomb,” Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Archives.
Ingmar Lee, “The Smiling Buddha Blast and Canada’s CANDU Snafu,” February 27, 2006.
Editorial, “Canada and India: The Nuclear Genie 40 Years on,” The Globe and Mail, April 15, 2015.
Interview on CBC International with Dr. Gordon Edwards on Canada’s intention to sell uranium to India, April 2015,
Endnotes for Exporting Disaster: The Cost of Selling CANDU Reactors
274. “An Overview of Federal Government Financial Involvement in the Canadian Nuclear Program”, Nuclear Policy Review Background Papers, EMR, Report No. ER81-2E, 1981, p. 311.
275. Gordon Sims, The Evolution of AECL, MA Thesis, Institute of Canadian Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, August 1979, p. 123.
276. Ron Finch, Exporting Danger, Black Rose Books, Montréal, 1986, p. 79.
277. “Datafile: India”, Nuclear Engineering International, February 1995, p. 22.
278. Sims, Ibid.
279. Robert Morrison & Edward Wonder, Canada’s Nuclear Export Policy, Carleton University Press, Ottawa, October 1978, pp. 17-18, cited in Finch, Ibid., FN 47, p. 160.
280. “Datafile: India”, Nuclear Engineering International, February 1995, p. 22.
281. “Narora ready to go back on line”, Nuclear Engineering International, December 1994, p. 10.
282. Neel Patri, “Rajasthan-2 down for 3 years to replace all pressure tubes”, Nucleonics Week, May 25, 1996, p. 3.
283. “Repairs continue at Rajasthan”, Nuclear Engineering International, September 1996, p. 4.
284. Neel Patri, “Rajasthan-2 down for 3 years to replace all pressure tubes”, Nucleonics Week, May 25, 1996, p. 3.
285. RAPP is now known as RAPS, for Rajasthan Atomic Power Station.
286. “Datafile: India”, Nuclear Engineering International, February 1995, p. 19.
287. PHWR is the non-commercial, or generic description of the CANDU reactor. Because India’s reactors (other than RAPS 1 & 2) have been built independently, this study refers to them as PHWRs.
288. Ibid., p. 21.
289. IAEA, Nuclear Research Reactors in the World, December 1995.
290. “Narora ready to go back on line”, Nuclear Engineering International, December 1994, p. 10.
291. “Outgoing regulator attacks industry shortcomings”, Nuclear Engineering International, August 1996, p. 6.
293. Neel Patri, “NPC funding continues to drop as Indian nuclear revenues lag”, Nucleonics Week, March 7, 1996, pp. 17-18.
295. “Datafile: India”, Nuclear Engineering International, February 1995, p. 24.
296. Thijs de la Court, et al., The Nuclear Fix, p. 108.
297. Leonard Spector, The New Nuclear Nations, Vintage, 1985, pp. 99 100.
298. Finch, Ibid., p. 84.
299. Finch, Ibid., pp. 86-87.
300. Finch, Ibid., p. 87.
301. Finch, Ibid., p. 96.
302. Finch, Ibid., pp. 97-98.
303. Finch, Ibid. p. 101.
304. Zia Mian and A.H. Nayyar, “A Time of Testing?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1996, p. 36.
305. Donna Bryson, “India’s nuclear stand based on fear, loss of face”, Globe & Mail, September 13, 1996.
306. Paul Watson, “India’s election winner vows atomic arsenal”, Toronto Star, May 12, 1996, p. A1 & A12.
307. Zia Mian and A.H. Nayyar, “A Time of Testing?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1996, p. 38.
308. CP, “Canada denies easing of ban”, Globe & Mail, October 15, 1996, p. A4.
309. COG CANDU Owners Group 1988 Annual Report, Chairman’s Message.
310. COG CANDU Owners Group 1989 Annual Report, p. 18.
311. “India’s CANDUs in bad condition”, WISE News Communiqué, October 7, 1994, p. 5.
312. “Retubing on the cards at Rajasthan”, Nuclear Engineering International, July 1993, p. 8.
313. Frank King, “Frank King – International Atomic Energy Agency”, Nuclear Business Review, Ontario Hydro Nuclear, Vol. 2 No. 10, October 1994, p. 8.
314. “Datafile: India”, Nuclear Engineering International, February 1995, p. 22.
315. Canadian Press, “AECL, Indian officials meet secretly, CTV says”, Globe & Mail, April 7, 1995.
316. Ray Silver, “COG seeks government guidance on cooperation with India”, Nucleonics Week, June 1, 1995, pp. 3 & 4.
317. CANDU Owners Group 1994/1995 Annual Report, “Manager’s Message”, p. 1.